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CLAIMS OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN
WIDE BAYS.
By a recent decision of the High Court of Justiciary in Edin-
burgh' (the Supreme Criminal Court of Scotland), a clause in an
Imperial Statute2 has been interpreted as an affirmation by the Brit-
ish Parliament of territorial jurisdiction, at least for the purpose of
fishery regulation, over an area of water on the northeast coast of
Scotland more than two thousand geographical square miles in
extent, and bounded by an imaginary line drawn between headlands
eighty miles apart. Correct as the decision no doubt was, it arrested
the attention of those interested in international law by its attribu-
tion to the British Parliament of a reaffirmaion of the theory of the
"King's Chambers," which, though at one time supported by Kent,
Wheaton and Phillimore, has found but little support from more
recent English authorities like Hall' and Westlake,' and has been
regarded by continental writers as having been abandoned as a gen-
eral principle by Great Britain and the United States in the second
half of the nineteenth century.5 The theory itself, which dates from
the time of John Selden,8 was a claim of "rights of property and
exclusive jurisdiction" over tracts of water along the coast of Eng-
land enclosed by lines drawn from headland to headland, irrespective
of the distance between them. It originated, says Selden, in
i6o4, when, during the war between Spain and the United Prov-
inces, in which England was neutral, the belligerents did not refrain
from carrying on hostilities even in English waters. To prevent
their incursions, James I., by ordinance of March 2nd, 16o4, caused
the limits of these waters to be fixed, and appointed experts to
describe the parts of the sea adjoining his kingdom in which the bel-
ligerents should enjoy the royal protection. These were also desig-
nated upon a map (which is reproduced in Mare Clausum [1635
i. Mortensen v. Peters (July 2oth, I9o6), Scots Law Times, xiv., p. 227.
The case has not yet appeared in the Court of Session Reports.
2. Herring Fisheries (Scotland) Act, 1889.
3. Hall, Interitational Law, 5th edition, p. 156.
4. Westlake, Intcrnational Law, i., p. 188.
5. Nys, Droit Int., i., p. 447.
6. Selden, Mare Clausum seu de Dominjo Maris (1635), lib. ii., cap. ii.,
pp. 236, et seq.
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ed.], p. 239) by lines joining the extreme promontories, and to the
space of water included thereby was given the name King's Cham-
bers, regiae camere or chambres royales, "to show," says Selden,
"that the King was master there."
It is this principle of determining the bays in which a littoral
State may exercise jurisdiction that appears to have been revived
three hundred years later in argument before a Scots Court, which
indeed proved itself not averse from using it to justify the claim
which it was constrained to hold that Parliament had made.
It is only fair to mention that the clause containing this claim is
an isolated clause in an Act dealing with the regulation of herring
fisheries, but it relates to a portion of the sea which Great Britain,
by signing the North Sea Convention of 1882, had already agreed,
perhaps for another purpose, to treat as high seas forming the Ger-
man Ocean. Moreover, the claim is inconsistent with a provision in
the subsequent Herring Fishery Act of 1895, setting forth the con-
ditions under which the Fishery Board of Scotland may make regu-
lations for herring fishery in waters up to thirteen miles distant from
the coasts of Scotland. These points will afterwards be set forth in
detail. Meanwhile I desire to make some mention of the way in
which wide bays are treated by individual States and by interna-
tional treaties with reference to territorial rights in them.
Of late years considerable attention has been given by Interna-
tional lawyers to questions concerning territorial waters, not merely
with regard to their seaward limit but also to the nature of the rights
possessed in them by the states whose coasts they bathe.7 But the
discussion passes over the problem of delimiting the extent of wide
bays because it relates mainly to the maritime belt which extends
into the open sea and is distinguished from proprietary waters in
which the littoral state has full rights of sovereignty. These pro-
prietary waters it is generally stated include ports, harbors, road-
steads, estuaries, bays and gulfs.
7. See "Territorial Waters; 'Questionnaire' Replies and Report."
Extracted from the 15th Annual Report of the Association for the reform
and codification of the Law of Nations; London, 1893. The Report contains
the replies received as to the existing law of Canada, Sweden and Norway,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Austria, in answer to the "Questionnaire" drawn
up and circulated by an influential and representative Committee on Terri-
torial Waters appointed by this Association in 1887. In an appendix is con-
tained the proposals with motifs, which Mr. (now Sir Thomas) Barclay
submitted for adoption to the Institute of International Law at its Geneva
meeting in 1892. Hereinafter referred to as Report. Cf. also Annuaire de
lInstilut de Dr. Int. XII and XIII; Godey, "La Mer Ctirc," Paris. 1896;
Schficking, Das Kiisteninur im int. Recht, Gittingen, 1897; and de Lapra-
delle, Le Droit de l' _8tat sur La Mer Territoriale, Paris, 1898.
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The distinction is not of recent date for it was taken by Cock-
bum, C. J., in the great case of Regina v. Keyn, i876, R. 2 Ex. Div.
63 at p. 162 (which led to the passing of the British Territorial
Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878). He there pointed out that by the
ancient common law of England a bay, gulf, or estuary inter fauces
terrae was considered part of the realm of England so that an offence
committed in parts of the sea so circumstanced could be dealt with
by the common law because they were considered to be within the
body of the adjoining county or counties from which the jury is to
ascertain the fact required to be drawn. The distinction has been
followed in the Scots Court,' and it is well recognized by continen-
tal writers and by the Institute of International Law. Thus in Ger-
many, to take only one instance, v. Liszt9 terms such waters Eigenge-
wiisser in opposition to Kiistengewiisser or coastal waters in which,
for his part, he concedes only a limited right of sovereignty to the
littoral state. The Institute in Resolutions10 adopted subsequently
to those dealing with territorial waters11 (to which we shall after-
wards refer) said in Section 2:
Les dits ports, havres, anses, rades et baies (c. i. d. bales et havres qui
peuvent Rtre assimilis a ces anses et rades), non seulement sont placis sous
un droit de souveraineti des ttats dont ils bordent le territoire nais encore
font partie du territoire de ces .ttats.
When, however, we inquire if there is any limit to the extent
of the bays which are thus considered to form part of the territory
of the littoral state we find no unanimity as to the rule of measure-
ment. The continental writers incline to state the rule without due
regard to state practice or with too much regard to international
conventions which are not of universal application, v. Liszt, for
example, says that the line of demarcation between territorial and
coastal waters in bays is usually fixed by an imaginary line drawn
from shore to shore at a point where the center of it is within range
of batteries erected on either shore. Despagne12 subordinates the
very existence of the limited right of sovereignty which he also con-
cedes, to the condition that the littoral state can exercise complete
command over the bay or gulf in its whole extent, which therefore,
8. Lord Advocate v. Trustees of the Clyde Navigation, i89i, x9 Court
of Session Reports (4th series), p. I74, per Lord Kyllachy (Judge of First
Instance).
9. Das V,5lkerrecht, 3rd ed. (i9o4) p. 85.
1o. Projet de r~glement sur le rigime l6gal des navires et de leurs equi-
pages dans les ports 6trangers (1897), XVI Annuaire, p. 231.
ii. DWfinition et r~gime de la mer territoriale (i894), XIII Annuaire, p.
328.
12. Cours de Dr. Int. (i9o5) Section 4o6.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
he says, ought not to exceed double the range of cannon shot from
the shore. Some English writers on the other hand discard all arti-
ficial limitations depending on the range of cannon shot and rest
their claim on the proximity of headlands enclosing the waters in
question. Thus, according to Wheaton,"3 the maritime territory of
every state extends to the ports, harbors, bays, mouths of rivers and
adjacent parts of the sea enclosed by headlands belonging to the
same state. Phillimore'4 (who upholds Britain's ancient claim to
the King's Chambers) states the rule in words containing only
slight alterations for the sake of clearness. But this rule is not
less objectionable than that based on artificial limits. It suffers
from vagueness, and gives no criterion of the distance between the
"headlands" or of the meaning of "enclosed." The headlands might
indeed be as far apart as the South Cape of Florida and the mouths
of the Mississippi between which Chancellor Kent proposed to draw
a line to mark off the territorial rights of the United States in the
Gulf of Mexico. Hall1 5 who is much more cautious puts his finger
on the true criterion, without indeed being able to give it precision,
when he says that there is nothing in the conditions of valid maritime
occupation to prevent the establishment of a claim to basins of con-
siderable area if approached by narrow entrances such as the Zuyder
Sea or to large gulfs which, in proportion to the width of their
mouths, run deeply into the land, even when so large as Delaware
Bay or still more to small bays such as that of Cancale.
The physical configuration and economic importance of bays
vary so much that it is perhaps hopeless to expect greater precision
in a rule which shall be applicable to them all, but it is well -to insist
on the element to which Hall refers. He puts in another way the
words intra fauces with which Lord Cockburn qualified the bays
that the ancient common law reckoned as part of the realm, and
which Wheaton and Phillimore had in view when they spoke of bays
being enclosed by headlands. As Dana said before the Halifax
Fishery Commissioners, 8 "Names will not help us. The Bay of
Bengal is not national property, it is not the King's Chambers; nor
is the Bay of Biscay, nor the Gulf of St. Lawrence. An inlet of the
sea may be called a bay and it may be two miles wide at its entrance,
or it may be called a bay and it may take a month's passage in an
old-fashioned sailing-vessel to sail from one headland to the other."
13. Ed. Atlay (1904) p. 275.
14. I. Int. Law, 284.
15. Int. Law, 5th ed.
16. (1877) Appointed under the Treaty of Washington, 1871, quoted in
t Phillimore, 288.
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The element of configuration to which Hall refers is important
because it implies that the littoral state can command the entrance
by armed force from the shore. It would, however, be wrong to
assume that the width of the entrance must not exceed twice the
three-mile limit because that limit relates to the extent of the mari-
time belt from which proprietary waters such as bays are distin-
guished, and because the entrance to the bay takes the place of
low-water mark which is the usual starting point for reckoning the
limit. Moreover it is impossible to say that the three-mile limit is
a rule of international law binding on all states at all times and for
all purposes. Originating as a working rule based on the principle
of Bynkershoek Potestatem terrae finiri ubi finitur armorum vis
(that the power of a state extends so far as it can reach), it has
been rendered by the increase in the range of modern cannon quite
inadequate for the protection of a littoral state.17 No state uni-
formly adopts it as a maximum for all purposes. The Territorial
Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878, for instance, proceeds on a preamble
which carefully abstains from laying down any general limit,18 and
solely for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction over vessels in such
seas defines territorial waters to be within one marine league from
low-water mark, and although the limit is commonly adopted for
neutrality purposes, the British Foreign Enlistment Act of I87o 9
simply refers to territorial waters without defining them.
17. As early as 1864, Mr. Seward, on behalf of the United States, sug-
gested to the British Legation at Washington that in view of the increased
range of projectiles the limit for neutrality purposes should be extended
from three miles to five. On the assumption that the neutral littoral zone
within the existing limits was entitled to the same protection as neutral soil,
Mr. Seward further suggested that belligerent war vessels should be pro-
hibited from opening fire within three miles of it. If the three-mile limit
were retained, and the increased range of cannon taken at five miles, he pro-
posed that the prohibition should be directed against firing within eight miles
of the neutral coast Cf. Bluntschli, Droit Int. Codi, tr. Lardy, 3rd ed. p.
i89. Fuller in Nys, Droit Int. L. p. 512.
18. The rightful jurisdiction of H. M., her heirs and successors extends
and has always extended over the open seas adjacent to the coasts of the
United Kingdom and of all other parts of H. M. dominions to such dis-
lance as is necessary for the defence and security of such dominions.
ig. The circular of Ioth February, 19o4, issued by Lord Lansdowne on
behalf of the Foreign Office under this act and addressed to the Lords Com-
missioners of the Admiralty with regard to the rules to be observed to main-
tain the neutrality of Great Britain during the Russo-Japanese war refers to
"British ports, roadsteads, or adjacent waters subject to the territorial juris-
diction of the British Crown."
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The Sea Fisheries Act, 1883 (46 and 47 Vic. c. 22), afterwards
referred to, which carries into effect as regards Great Britain the
provisions of the North Sea Convention of 1882, also abstains from
giving a general definition even to the exclusive fishery limits of
Great Britain.
The preamble to the Paris Resolutions20 adopted by the Institute
of International Law in 1894 proceeds also on the insufficiency of
the three-mile limit for the protection of fishery rights. To meet
the new conditions, the. Institute recommended de lege ferenda a dis-
tance of six geographical miles, measured from low-water mark,
for adoption as a general rule, allowing (Art. 4) a riparian State in
time of war to fix by its declaration of neutrality, or by special noti-
fication, its neutral zone beyond the six miles up the range of guns
on the coast.2
1
For the purpose of this paper it will be sufficient to quote Arti-
cles I to 3 of the Resolutions which run as follows :--
"i. L'dtat a un droit de souverainet6 sur une zone de la mer qui
baigne la c6te, sauf le droit de passage inoffensif rdserv6 i l'article 5.
"2. La mer territoriale s'dtend i six milles matins (6o au
degr6 de latitude) de la laisse de basse marde sur toute l'dtendue
des c6tes.
"3. Pour les baies, la mer territoriale suit les sinuosit6s de la
c6te, sauf qu'elle est mesurde A partir d'une ligne droite tirde en
travers de la baie dans la partie la plus rapprochde de l'ouverture
vers la mer o1 l'6cart entre les deux c~tes de la baie est de douze
2o. Considrant qu'il n'y a pas de raison pour confondre en une seule zone
la distance nicessaire pour l'exercice de la souverainet6 et pour la protection
de la pche littorale et celle qui est pour garantir la neutralit6 des non-
belligirants en temps de guerre; que la distance la plus ordinairement adoptie
de trois milles de la laisse de basse mare a d6 reconnue insuffisante pour la
protection de la pche littorale; que cette distance ne correspond pas non
plus i la porte relle des canons placis sur la c6te."
21. After the publication of the Paris- Resolutions the Dutch Government,
in December, 1895, addressed a Collective Note to the Powers, inviting them
to an international agreement -based on these resolutions, which would have
had the effect of making the second neutrality zone proposed by the Insti-
tute and extending to twelve miles from low-water mark obligatory on all
the Powers. The increased obligations which this project would have
imposed upon neutrals in maintaining respect for their neutrality led to the
rejection of the proposal. It was felt, moreover, that the adoption of this
limit might lead to violations of neutral territory on the part of belligerents
in consequence of the limitation of the theater of marine hostilities.
Cf. Godey, La Mer Cbtijre, 1896, p. 24; Nys, Int. Law, i., p. 513; Schiicking,
Die Verwendung von Minen im Seekrieg; Zeitschrift fRr Int. Priv. U. Off.
Recht. (iqo6), xiv., I21, at 138.
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milles marins de largeur t! moins qu'un usage continu et siculaire
n'ait consacri une largeur plus grande."
Several well-known decisions on the territorial character of wide
bays would fall under the exception, under-lined above, which the
Institute was constrained to admit to its proposed rule of measure-
ment. They were nearly all cases of true bays for the width of their
entrance though greater than double the three-mile limit was much
less than the extent to which they ran into the adjoining land. Thus
Chesapeake Bay, a long arm of the Atlantic Ocean, running roughly
north and south, and cutting into the States of Virginia and Mary-
land, is claimed by the United States. Measuring twelve miles in
width at its entrance between Cape Charles and Cape Henry, in the
State of Virginia, it is at least two hundred miles in extent, although
it is probably nowhere more than twenty miles wide. The terri-
torial character of this bay was, after mature deliberation, judicially
affirmed for all purposes by the American Court of Commissioners
of Alabama Claims in the case of the Alleganean,22 in which it was
essential for the Court to decide whether a particular place in the
bay south of the Rappahannock River, and more than four miles
from any land, was, or was not, in the "high seas" within the mean-
ing of Section 5 of Act of Congress of June 5th, 1872, which enti-
tled American citizens, under certain circumstances, to recover com-
pensation from the United States for losses sustained by the'depre-
dations of the Confederate navy in the Civil War.
Delaware Bay, fifteen miles in width at the entrance, was claimed
by the Executive Government of the United States in 1793, when, at
the instance of Great Britain, they compelled the restoration of the
British ship Grange, which had been captured by the French in the
bay, in violation of the neutrality of the United States.23 This
claim, in which both Great Britain and France acquiesced, depended,
according to Wharton,2 4 solely on "the fact that the United States
are proprietors of the lands on both sides of the Delaware, from its
head to its entrance to the sea." Here also we have an application
of the King's Chambers theory.
Long Island Sound, between Long Island and the State of Con-
necticut, was held to be part of New York State, and subject to its
jurisdiction.25
22. Albany Law Journal, xxxii., 484; Moore's Int. Arbit., iv., 433; id.,
v., 4675; Scott's Leading Cases on Int. Law, 143.
23. American State Papers, i., 73.
24. F. Wharton, A Digest of the International Law of the United States,
vol. i., p. 75, Section 28.
25. Mahler v. Transportation Company (1866), 35 N. Y. 352. Quoted in
Scott's Leading Cases on Int. Law, p. 153.
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On the other hand, the claim of Great Britain that the Bay of
Fundy, lying between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, was a Brit-
ish bay, from which United States fishermen were excluded by the
Treaty between Great Britain and the United States of 1818, has
been abandoned since 1845.26 This bay, which is from sixty-five to
seventy-five miles wide, and from one hundred and thirty to one
hundred and forty miles long, with several "bays" in its coasts, has
one of its headlands in the United States (Maine), and it must be
traversed for a long distance by vessels bound to Passamaquoddy
Bay (lying between Maine and New Brunswick). Moreover, it
contains a United States island, Little Menan, on the line between
the headlands. For these reasons, Mr. Bates, the umpire to whom
the claim of the owners of the United States schooner Washington
(seized and confiscated for illegal fishing in the bay under the Treaty
of 1818) had been referred, under the provisions of the Treaty of
Washington, 1871, decided that the bay must be considered as an
arm of the open sea.
27
The territorial character of the Bay of Conception, in Newfound-
land, which runs forty miles into the land, and has an entrance
twenty miles wide, was unanimously affirmed by the British Privy
Council in 1877 in the case of the Direct United States Cable Com-
pany, Limited, v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Company, Lim-
ited.28 The court here went partly on the configuration of the bay,
and partly on the historical evidence of a continued claim to terri-
torial sovereignty on the part of Great Britain.
The only case prior to Mortenisen v. Peters, already mentioned,
in which a British court has had to deal with the territorial charac-
ter of a large arm of the sea in England, is Regina v. Cunningham
(Bell's Crown Cases, 86), relating to the Bristol Channel. Here
the Queen's Bench expressed the opinion that the whole of this
channel between Somerset and Glamorgan is to be considered as
within the counties by the shores of which its several parts are
respectively bounded. It follows, therefore, that, in the opinion of
the Court, the Bristol Channel so defined was subject to the terri-
torial sovereignty of Great Britain.
The following descri'tion of the Bristol Channel is condensed
from the judgment of the Piivy Council in the Direct United States
Cable Company's case --
It is an arm of the sea dividing England and Wales, into the upper end
of which the River Severn flows. On the English side its boundary is
ze. Cf. Phillinmore, Int. Law, i., p. 289.
27. Report of Commissions of Claims, 1853, p. 170. Quoted in Wharton,
Digest, iii., Section 305. at p. 59.
28. Law Reports, Appeal Cases, ii., 394.
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formed by the counties of Somerset and Devon, and on the Welsh side by
the counties of Glamorgan, Carmarthen, and Pembroke. The channel
widens as it descends, and between Port Eynonhead, the lowest point in
Glamorgan, and the opposite coast of Devon, is, roughly, twenty miles wide;
while lower still, between Hartland Point, in Devon, and the opposite coast
of Pembroke, the width is about thirty-seven and a half miles. The case
did not decide what was to be regarded as the entrance to the Bristol Channel,
but it is incidentally stated in the case reserved for the opinion of the court,
that from Penarth Roads, where the crime was committed, to the mouth of
the channel, is a distance of ninety miles. This, as the Privy Council indi-
cate, would point to the headlands in Pembroke, and Hartland Point, in
Devon, as being the fauces of that arm of the sea.
The opinion was perhaps unnecessary for the decision of the
question at issue, as the court was only asked to decide whether a
particular spot in Penarth Roads in the Bristol Channel, and ten
miles from the coast of Somerset, on the opposite side at which
three foreigners on board a foreign ship had committed a crime, was
within the county of Glamorgan in Wales, the indictment having,
whether necessary or not, charged the offence as having been com-
mitted in that county. After an elaborate argument the indictment
was sustained, and the opinion which I have quoted was also
expressed.
From the Report of the Association and other sources one is able,
apart from decided cases, to give some indication of the municipal
law as to bays in countries other than those already mentioned.
Thus, with regard to Canada, Mr. A. R. Gordon29 says -
"The contention of Canada has ever been that all bays are terri-
torial waters, where both headlands forming the extremities are
within the territory of the State. As declaratory of this right the
Bay of Chaleur has been continuously closed to the United States
fishermen since shortly after their denunciation of the Fishery
Clauses of the Washington Treaty, 1871, the distance from Birch
Point Lighthouse to Point Macquereau Light being sixteen miles,
these two points having been selected as being easily discernible
objects to define the delimiting line, though the narrowest part of
the entrance is between N. Nya Point and Macquereau, and is only
fourteen and a half miles. Excepting this bay, all other bays
exceeding six miles in width at entrance have been, as an act of
grace, opened temporarily as a fishing-ground to United States fish-
ermen in common with our citizens."
Western Australia, says Mr. Haynes, 30 gravely advances an
ambiguous claim to all bays the headlands of which are "in sight
29. Report, p. i. Replies of Mr. A. R. Gordon, Canada.
3o. "Territorial Waters and Ocean Fishery Rights," by T. H. Haynes;
Report of Guildhall Conference of the Association for Refortmi, etc., of Int.
Law, 1894, p. 107.
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of one another." The colony also claims Exmouth Gulf, twelve and
a half miles across, and Shanks Bay, with passage thereto, thirteen
and a half and twenty miles in width. In 1889, she obtained a Pearl
and Bche-de-mer Fishing (Extra-territorial) Act, which received
the Royal Assent in 189o , and empowers her to apply her local Fish-
ing Acts to British vessels engaged in pearl fishing beyond the three-
mile limit of the coast of the colony. The effect of the Act is to sub-
ject such vessels not only to an export duty on shells raised by them
outside the said limit, but to an import duty on stores which they
take on board from their own vessels, and which may never have
entered the Colony.81
The German Empire, long before the North Sea Convention of
1882, which st:ggested the rule to France and Belgium, limited its
claim of territ, rial sovereignty, at least as regards exclusive fishery
rights, to bays which are not more than ten sea miles in width, reck-
oned from the extreme points of land. 'The acquiescence of Great
Britain in this claim is shown by the Notification of the Board of
Trade of December, 1874, issued for the guidance and warning of
British fishermen fishing off the coasts of the German Empire. The
Notification recited that an agreement had been reached between the
governments of the respective countries regarding the regulations
to be observed by British fishermen, and detailed the exceptional cir-
cumstances in which such fishermen were allowed to enter these lim-
its.3 2  Germany claims also the Bay of Stettin, in the Baltic, and
Jade Bay, in the North Sea (formerly the estuary of the Weser) 
.33
The territorial character of the Frisches Haff, near K6nigsberg, and
the Kurisches Haff, near Memel, are incontestable, since these
3. Report, .1. 97. Notes by Mr. T. H. Haynes.
32. Herstlet, Commercial Treaties, xiv., p. io58, altering Notification of
exclusive fishery limits of North German Confederation, October, i868, given
at p. io55, ante. These limits were designated by the Imperial Government
as follows :-"The tract of the sea which extends to a distance of three sea
miles from the extremest limit which the ebb leaves dry of the German North
Sea coast and the German islands or flats lying before them, as well as those
bays and incurvations of the coast which are ten sea miles or less in breadth,
reckoned from the extremest points of the land and the flats, must be con-
sidered as under the territorial sovereignty of the German Empire." The
application of this rule would apparently give to Germany the Mecklenburger
Bucht, which measures ten geographical miles (i5-1 degrees) between Staber
Huk, on the Island of Fehmarn, and Darsser Ort, in Pomerania, and Kieler
Bucht, measuring the same distance between Schaaby, in Alsen, and Markels-
dorfer Huk, on the Island of Fehmarn. On the other hand, the Danziger
Bucht, if measured between Rixh6ft and Brilsterort. appears to be thirteen
and a half sea miles wide at the entrance. See Debas, Neuer Ilandatlas
(1897), sheets 16 and 17.
33. Oppenheim, Int. Law, (i9o5), i., p. 247.
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waters are practically land-locked. The estuary of the Elbe is also
claimed as German. 3 '
Norway, which possesses the most indented coast-line in Europe,
has, from ancient times" asserted for all purposes a four-mile limit
to its territorial waters, which are measured, not from the mainland,
but from the outermost island off the coast which is not submerged
by the sea.38 It was because she was unable to obtain international
recognition for this claim that she withdrew from the Hague Con-
vention of I882, 7 on the policing of the fisheries in the North Sea,
and is not a signatory to the Convention to which that Conference
led."'
With regard to bays, 'Ton estime en g6n6ral," says Kleen,39 "que
si une baie s'enfonce dans une c6te, la ligne, qui constitue la limite
ext6rieure du territorire maritime, n'a nullement besoin de suivre la
c6te exactement, mais qu'elle peut 6tre tir6e parall~lement A une
ligne droite entre les deux pointes du continent, qui gardent l'entr6e
de la baie. MEme loi, si les deux pointes en question sont formes
par deux iles ou brisants en dehors de la c6te."
The most recent Norwegian application of the same principle is
found in the Royal Resolution of September 9 th, 1889, by which the
exterior limit of the maritime territory in which fishing is exclu-
sively reserved to Norwegian subjects, is defined with regard to the
coast of Romsdal's Amt40 by a line starting from a point almost due
34. See Proc. Verb. de la Con frence de la Haye, i881. "Pche dans la
mer du Nord," Martens's Nouv. Rec. Gen., 2nd Series, ix., p. 51o.
35. Kleen, in the Report, mentions a Danish Decree of October I7th, 1868,
in which this claim is made.
36. Bestemmelser om Territorial-Graendsen, Section i. By Rescript of
February 25th, 1812, it is provided that the territorial limits "shall be reck-
oned to the ordinary distance of a sea mile from the outermost island, or
islet, which is not submerged by the sea." Quoted in Norsk Fiskerahnanak
udgivet of Selskabet for de Norske Fisheriers Fremme, Bergen, 1903, p. 215.
Kleen (Report, p. 20), adds: "Bien entendu sous condition que cette ile ou ce
brisant ne soit pas situ6 plus loin de la cte qu'une lieue gdographique;" but
this condition does not appear in the Rescript.
37. "Le diligu6 de la Norv~ge, M. E. Bretteville, ne peut pas accepter la
fixation des limites territoriales i 3 milles, surtout en ce qui concerne les
baies."--Proc~s-verbaux in Martens's Nouv. Rec. Gdn., 3rd series, ix., p. 5io.
38. Proc6s-verb. No. 2, 6 May, 1882; Martens, ut sup., p. 554. Cf. also
Annuaire, XI, 141.
39. Report, p. ig.
40. "A line drawn at a distance of one geographical mile and parallel to a
line from Storholm over Skraapen (outside Haro), Gravskjaar (outside
Ona), and Kalven (the outermost of the Orksjaerne) to the outermost
Jaeveleholm (outside Grip), is to be regarded as the seaward limit of the cor-
responding coast of Romsdal's Amt in which fishing is reserved exclusively
to the population of this counfry."-(Quoted in Norsk Fiskeralmanak, p. 215;
cf. Report, p. 25, n. i.)
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north of Aalesund, and running in a northeasterly direction to a
point due north of Kristiansund, enclosing a considerable extent of
water off the coast of Romsdal's Amt. The islands from which the
line is drawn are those lying farthest out from the mainland at the
points in question, and are more than twenty miles apart.
Spain claims to exercise jurisdiction over a zone extending six
miles from its coasts, and this, according to Riquelme, 41 has never
given rise to any claim or protest on behalf of other States.42
This claim to a six-mile limit appears now to be made only for the
purposes of revenue protection and fishery regulation. For all other
purposes, says N'ys,' 3 the three-mile limit is the general rule.
Russia-at least, for purposes of war and neutrality-claims as
territorial the whole of the waters of the White Sea, whose entrance
is more than sixty miles in width. Aubert" quotes Russian Admir-
alty Instructions of 1893, in which the territorial limits of this bay
are given, "viz., southwards of a line drawn, at a distance of three
miles, between Siratoi-Noss (a headland on the northeast coast of
the peninsula of Kola) and Kanina-Noss' (the northwest extremity
of the peninsula of Kanin). The distance between these two points
is, he says, more than a degree of latitude.
Of International Conventions in which the extent of jurisdiction
in wide bays is stipulated, I may again refer to the Fishery Conven-
tion between Great Britain and France of 1839.45  It was therein
provided that the rights of fishing in a zone extending three miles
seaward from low-water mark on the coasts of the contracting
States should be exclusively reserved to the subjects of the respect-
41. Elementos de derecho publico international, i., p. 23 (849); quoted
in the Report (p. 114). A Customs Ordinance of November Igth, 1884,
authorizes the exercise of Customs jurisdiction . . . "as regards the coast,
from the moment when a vessel enters the jurisdictional waters of Spain,
which extend to six miles, equivalent to ii.IIi kilometres from the coast."
42. Wheaton (ed. Atlay, 19O4), p. 227) refers to protests on the part of
Great Britain and United States which are later in date than Riquelme's work.
Thus, during the American Civil War, the Unietd States refused to recog-
nize the six-mile limit in regard to the neutrality of Cuba (see Note, Mr.
Seward to Mr. Tassara, August ioth, 1863). Wharton's Digest, i., p. 1o3,
Section 32. In 1874, Lord Derby intimated to the Spanish Government that
their pretensions would not be submitted to by Great Britain, and that any
attempt to carry them out would lead to serious consequences. U. S. Dip.
Corr., 1875, p. 641. Mr. Fish also stated, on the part of the United States
Government, "We have always understood and asserted that, pursuant to
public law, no nation can rightfully claim jurisdiction at sea beyond a marine
league from its coasts." Wharton's Digest, i., p. 1O5, Section 32.
43. Nys, Droit Int. i., p. 511.
44- Rev. gin. de Dr. Int. Pub. 1894, p. 44o.
45. Hertslet., Coin. Treaties, v., 86.
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ive States. With regard to bays, Section 9 provided as follows :-
"It is equally agreed that the distance of three miles fixed as a gen-
eral limit for the exclusive right of fishing upon the coasts of the two
countries shall, with respect to bays, the mouths of which do not
exceed ten miles in width, be measured from a straight line drawn
from headland to headland." This stipulation was repeated in Art.
i of the Fishery Convention between the same countries of 1867.46
In the case of the Bay of Cancale, between Cape Carteret and Point
Meinga, in Brittany (seventeen miles wide), an express reservation
of exclusive fishing rights is stipulated for France by both Conven-
tions.
The North Sea Convention of 1882 for the regulation of the
police of fisheries in the North Sea outside territorial waters contains,
a clause with reference to bays which corresponds to that in the
Anglo-French Convention of 1867, but is framed in more precise
terms.' 7 The Convention contains a conventional delimitation of
the North Sea south of the 61st degree of north latitude, and pro-
vides inter alia that on the west it is bounded by the east coasts of
Great Britain and Ireland. After providing that the fishermen of
each country shall enjoy the exclusive rights of fishing within the
distance of three miles from low-water mark along the whole extent
of the coasts of their respective countries, as well as of the dependent
islands and banks, Article 2 of the Convention goes on to say:-
"As regards bays, the distance of three miles shall be measured
from a straight line drawn across the bay, in the part nearest the
entrance, at the first point where the width does not exceed ten miles.
"The present Article shall not in any way prejudice the freedom
of navigation and anchorage in territorial waters accorded to fish-
ing boats, provided they conform to the special police regulations
enacted by the Powers to whom the shore belongs."' 7
A similar provision is contained in the subsequent Convention
concluded between two of the signatories, Great Britain and Den-
mark on 21st June, i9o5, with reference to the fishing off the Faroe
Islands and Iceland which lie north of the 6ist degree of latitude.48
By Treaty between Spain and Portugal 9 (subsequent in date to
46. Martens, Nouv. Rec. Gin., xx., 465.
47. Procds-verbaux in Parl. Papers (3238), 1882; also Martens, Nouv.
Recceil Gin., 2nd Series, IX, 505. The date of the Convention is May 6th,
1882, and the signatories are Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Denmark,
France and Holland. See Martens, ut sup., 556.
48. Five Treaty Series, i9o3, No. 5; Archives Diplomatiques (1903) 3-
i~me sir. Tom. 86, Parts 5 and 6, p. i.
49. Quoted by Professor Torres Compos in the Report, p. 93.
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the North Sea Convention), as regards the police regulations of
coast fisheries (reglanzento de policia de la pezca costanera), signed
at Madrid on October 2nd, 1885, it was provided that the limits
within which the general right of fishing is reserved exclusively to
fishermen, subject to the respective countries (juridicciones), is six
miles measured from low-water mark. For bays whose entrance
does not exceed twelve miles, the six miles are measured from a
straight line drawn from one side to the other. The miles referred
to are geographical miles of sixty to the degree of latitude. In this
treaty no addition is made, as in the North Sea Convention, to
double the territorial limit at the entrance, but the ordinary limit is
the six miles customarily claimed by Spain, which of course is itself
double that of the North Sea Convention. The clause is exactly
that recommended by the Institute's Paris Resolutions.
Several of the States which signed the North Sea Convention
have expressly adopted in their domestic legislature the ten-mile
limit for bays. Thus in I888 France enacted a law
5 prohibiting
foreign vessels from fishing in the territorial waters of France and
Algeria and in defining the limits of these waters she adopted almost
textually the provisions of the Convention. It is interesting to note
that this legislation applies to French waters other than those which
border the North Sea of the Convention. Belgium and Holland
51
have each followed the example of France in excluding foreign ves-
sels from fishing within the exclusive fishery limits. The Belgian
law of August I9 th, 1891, is expressly based on the stipulations of
Articles 2 and 3 of the North Sea Convention of 1882, which it
embodies. For fishery purposes, therefore, the ten-mile limit is
applied to Belgian bays. I have not been able to ascertain whether
the Dutch law of October 26th, 1889, takes the same course, but the
remark of De Lapradelle leads me to suppose that it does.
There is evidence, therefore, that the ten-mile limit for bays
which has been adopted in international conventions is making head-
way also as a national limit for fishery purposes among certain
States which do not possess a coastline of great incurvations. There
is, however, little likelihood that it will find general acceptance
among States with a coastline of different configuration. If, for
instance, the eastern coast of the British Isles had been as serrated
50. Clunet, Journal de Droit Int. PrivY, XIII. 126; See State Papers
(Great Britain) Vol. lxxix, p. 232, for the French Decree delimiting, under
this law, the bays in Algeria in which exclusive fishery rights are claimed for
French nationals.
Si. De Lapradelle, La Mer Territorialc, p. 45.
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as the west coast of Scotland, Great Britain, one may be sure, would
not have agreed to the conventional delimitation of the German
Ocean by the North Sea Convention.
In Great Britain attention has been drawn to this subject by the
extensive claim to territorial jurisdiction over the Moray Firth,
which the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh in the case of
Mortensen v. Peters,5 2 declared to have been made by the Herring
Fisheries (Scotland) Act of 1889. Although, according to the court,
the claim was asserted only for certain specified purposes, yet it
appears to be inconsistent, not only with the limits of territorial
waters in the North Sea, as defined by and acquiesced in by Great
Britain in the North Sea Convention of 1882, but also with a pro-
vision in a subsequent Statute of the British Parliament, the Herring
Fisheries Amendment Act, 1895, to which I shall afterwards refer.
It was only indirectly that an international issue was raised in the
case, for the court considered that it had to deal purely with a ques-
tion of construction arising on a clause in an Imperial Statute. But
at least indirectly there was an international bearing, since the ques-
tion at issue was whether a Statute creating an offence was binding
on non-British subjects in what, but for previous statutory enact-
ments, would undoubtedly have been held to be the high seas. The
circumstances of the case were briefly these
The Danish master of the steam-trawler Niobe, registered in
Sandefjord, Norway, was tried and convicted at the Sheriff Court,
Dornoch (Cromartyshire), of having committed an offence under
the Sea Fisheries Acts and Herring Fisheries (Scotland) Act, inas-
much as he had used at a place in the Moray Firth, five miles or
thereby east by north from Lossiemouth, the method of otter-trawl-
ing which, by a by-law of the Scottish Fishery Board, is a method
prohibited under penalty throughout the entire Moray Firth within
a line drawn from Duncansby Head, in Caithness-shire, to Rattray
Point, in Aberdeenshire. At the instance of the master, the case
came on appeal before the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh,
where it was elaborately argued before a full Bench, composed of
twelve of the thirteen judges who form the Scots Supreme Court.
The appellant's case-was that the alleged offence, having been com-
mitted on a foreign vessel at a spot more than three miles from low-
water mark on the Scottish coasts, was not cognizable by the Scots
Court. Being a foreigner, he was not bound by a British Statute
creating an offence in what was otherwise the high seas. These
contentions were overruled by the court in a unanimous judgment
by which the conviction was upheld.
52. Supra, note i.
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For a proper understanding of the point at issue, it is necessary
to give some account of the geographical features of the Moray
Firth, and of the British Fishery Legislation affecting Scotland, on
the construction of which the court had to give its opinion.
(i) The Moray Firth proper is the most important of the arms"8
of the sea running in a southwesterly direction into the mainland
of Scotland on its northeast coast. So far as it can be said to have
headlands, these are formed on the one hand by Tarbet Ness (in
Cromartyshire), which divides it from the smaller Dornoch Firth,
and on the other by Burgh Head, a headland on the northwest coast
of Elgin. The distance between these headlands is about fifteen
miles, and the total extent of the Firth from that entrance to the
mouth of the Beauly Firth, into which it merges at its upper end, is
about thirty-one miles. This is the Moray Firth as it is usually
designated on standard atlases and on the charts issued by the Brit-
ish Admiralty. But the area of water in question in Mortensen v.
Peters was immensely larger, including the Moray, Cromarty, and
Dornoch Firths, and extending seaward to a limit which had been
laid down by a by-law of the Fishery Board for Scotland under
powers delegated from Parliament.
This seaward limit can be readily appreciated on reference to a
large scale map of Scotland, for it will then be seen that a straight
line drawn in a southeasterly direction from Duncansby Head"
5
(the extreme northeast point on the mainland of Scotland, Caith-
ness-shire) to Rattray Point, 5 on the east coast of Aberdeenshire
(north of the seaport town of Peterhead), encloses a stretch of
water forming, roughly, an equilateral triangle, its base being on the
north coast-line of the counties of Aberdeen, Banff, and Elgin. The
line between Duncansby Head and Rattray Point represents a dis-
tance of some eighty geographical miles, and the area enclosed by
it to the westward is close on two th6usand square geographical
miles. Now it is this immense area of water which the High Court
of Justiciary, interpreting a clause in an Act of Parliament, has
declared to be (at least for certain purposes) within the territorial
jurisdiction of Great Britain. It is plain, from the map, that the
53. The others are the Cromarty Firth, an entirely land-locked bay, lying
to the northwest, with its entrance in the Moray Firth; and the Dornoch
Firth, a true bay, lying to the north, and separated from the Moray Firth by
Tarbet Ness.
54. Approximately in longitude 30 degrees, 59 minutes west of Green-
wich, latitude 58 degrees, 38 minutes north.
55. Approximately in longitude 2 degrees west of Greenwich, latitude 57
degrees, 27 minutes, 30 seconds north.
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waters to the west of this line enter a coast-line of peculiar configu-
ration, which only by stretching language can be called a bay. They
include, as we have seen, two smaller areas of water, to which the
term is not inappropriate, viz., at the western end of the triangle,
the Moray Firth proper and the Dornoch Firth. But the headlands
between which the line is drawn cannot reasonably be called the
entrance to the statutory Moray Firth. Duncansby Head is simply
the point at which the coast-line, after trending to the northwest,
turns sharply to the west. Rattray Head, so far from being a head-
land in this connection, is actually to the south of Kinnaird Head,
which, on the principle underlying the choice of Duncansby Head,
might serve as the western headland to the bay. It happens, how-
ever, to be the first land which an imaginary line drawn southeast
half east from Duncansby Head would touch on the Aberdeen coast.
The waters"8 enclosed by this line are not then properly comparable
with those of any of the bays mentioned at an earlier part of this
paper, e. g., Cancale Bay, Bay of Conception, or Delaware Bay.
They bear most resemblance to the Bristol Channel, of which a
description has already been given.
Let me now refer to the Fishery Legislation5T leading up to the
Acts which the Court was called upon to construe.
The first definition of the coasts of Scotland is given in the Herr-
ing Fishery (Scotland) Act, 1867 (3o and 31 Vic., c. 52), Section
ii of which provides that this expression, as used in the Act, "shall
mean and include all bays, estuaries, and arms of the sea, and all
tidal waters within three miles from the mainland or adjacent
islands."
No innovation in the definition of Scottish territorial waters was
made by the next Act, the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883 (46 and 47 Vic.,
c. 22), which, as regards Great Britain, carried into effect the pro-
56. And their extent has not escaped even judicial comment, for in au
earlier case before the same court (in which no question of the right of for-
eigners arose), the statutory Moray Firth was referred to "as a very exten-
sive space . . . which includes the Moray Firth, but extends very much
beyond what can properly be considered as a firth, and includes part of the
ocean at a great distance from the shore," per Lord Kincairney in Green v.
Leith, 23 Court of Session Reports, 1896, 4th series, vol. xxiii., Justiciary
Cases, p. 5o, at p. 54; and, again, "as a part of the sea of vast extent, and
extending far out into the practically open sea for a considerable number of
miles." Per Lord Justice Clerk Kingsburgh, Wilson v. Rust, loc. cit., p. 56 at
p. 65.
57. These Acts may be conveniently referred to in the Manual of the Sea
Fisheries (Scotland) Acts and Statutory By-laws, issued by the Fishery
Board for Scotland, igoI, C. .D. 428. Price Is. 2d.
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visions of the North Sea Convention, 1882. By this Statute certain
things were declared (Section 4) to be offences "within the exclu-
sive fishery limits of the British Islands," and these limits were
defined (Section 28) in general terms to mean "that portion of the
seas surrounding the British Islands, within which Her Majesty's
subjects have by international law the exclusive right of fishing, and
where such portion is defined by the terms of any convention,
treaty, or arrangement for the time being in force between Her
Majesty and any foreign State, includes, as regards the sea fishing-
boats and officers and subjects of that State, the portion so defined."
In this Act, therefore, there was nothing out of which a claim to
jurisdiction in territorial waters could be made save on the prin-
ciple of international law, or by the terms of convention.
The next Act-the Sea Fisheries (Scotland) Amendment Act,
1885-conferred important powers on the Fishery Board of Scot-
land. It empowered that body to issue by-laws (for the validity
of which certain formalities and procedure were prescribed) to
restrict or prohibit any method of sea-fishing in any part of the sea
adjoining Scotland, and within the exclusive fishery limits of the
British Islands, where such mode of fishing was, in the opinion of
the Board, injurious to any kind of sea-fishing within such port. It
was provided that the Board might make similar restrictions, or
prohibitions, to enable it to make experiments. As this Act was to
be read and construed along with that of 1883, no alteration was
made by it in the definition of the exclusive fishery limits of the Brit-
ish Islands.
In 1889, however, an Act was passed which, at least in one par-
ticular, legislated for waters outside the exclusive fishery limits, as
defined by the previous Statute. This was the Herring Fishery
(Scotland) Act, 1889 (52 and 53 Vic., c. 23), which had been passed
at the instance of the line fishermen to protect them against the dam-
age which was believed to be caused by the steam-trawlers. The Act
contained a general prohibition against beam or otter-trawling, not
only within three miles of low-water mark of any part of the coast
of Scotland, but also in a list of waters which was specified in a
schedule to the Act, save only between such points on the coast, or
within such other defined areas as might from time to time be per-
mitted by by-laws of the Scottish Fishery Board. The Board was
therefore empowered to open parts of the waters which by the gen-
eral prohibition were closed.
The schedule specifies waters which, for the most part, are on
the west coast of Scotland, but at the end enumerates also certain
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firths and bays on the east coast. Among them is the upper part of
Moray Firth.
This Act also contains in Section 7 the explicit provision with
regard to the Moray Firth, on which the case under discussion
turned. It runs as follows:-
(i) The Fishery Board may, by by-law or by-laws, direct that
the methods of fishing known as beam-trawling and otter-trawling
shall not be used within a line drawn from Duncansby Head, in
Caithness, to Rattray Point, in Aberdeenshire, in any area or areas
to be defined in such by-law, and may from time to time make, alter,
and revoke, by-laws for the purposes of this section, but no such
by-law shall be of any validity until it has been confirmed by the
Secretary for Scotland."
In 1892 the Fishery Board exercised the powers conferred on it
by this section, and on 27th September issued a by-law (No. IO)
which was approved by the Secretary for Scotland on 22nd Novem-
ber, and by which the entire area, as defined in the section, was
closed to beam or trawl fishermen.
The validity of this by-law was challenged in 1896 in the case of
Green v. Leith, above referred to, on the ground that the Fishery
Board was entitled to close only one area or more within the speci-
fied limit, and could not, therefore, prohibit trawling within the whole
of the waters enclosed by the line between Duncansby Head and
Rattray Point. This view was upheld by the Court of Justiciary
when that case came before them on appeal, and a conviction
obtained against a British trawler for an offence obtained under
this by-law was quashed. But in the almost immediately subse-
quent case of Wilson v. Rust5" the same court reconsidered the
validity of the by-law, and by a majority of five judges to two sus-
tained it on the neat ground that the whole area was within, because
none of it was without, the defined limit between the two headlands.
It was moreover pointed out that the word "area," as used in
clause 7, was a neutral term, in no way implying an antithesis to the
whole.
The effect, then, of this decision was to close the entire Moray
Firth, as defined by the by-law, to trawling vessels registered in
Great Britain. To escape the restriction thus imposed, it is under-
stood that the British owners of such vessels caused them to be
registered in foreign countries, e. g., in Norway, in the belief that to
vessels flying a foreign flag the restriction would not apply. This
58. February 27th, 1896, 23 Court of Session Reports, 4th series (Jus-
ticiary Cases), p. 56.
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expedient proved successful, for until recently the Scottish Law
Officers of the Crown held the opinion that the by-law could not be
enforced against foreigners. Owing to the agitation caused by the
British fishermen, who were chagrined to find that the waters from
which they were themselves excluded were becoming a close preserve
for foreign trawlers, the whole question was reconsidered, and in
19o4 a prosecution was raised against a foreigner, Olsen, the Nor-
wegian master of the steam-trawler Catalonia, registered in Stavan-
ger, Norway, for fishing by the prohibited method within the Dor-
noch Firth, at a point four miles southeast from Brora Point, con-
trary to By-law No. 2 of the Fishery Board, by which beam or
otter-trawling at the place in question was prohibited. In the
Sheriff Court of Dornoch the judge sustained Olsen's plea of no
jurisdiction, based on the averment that the Catalonia, being regis-
tered in Norway, and Norway not being one of the Powers signatory
to the North Sea Convention of 6th May, 1882, the master was not
subject to the jurisdiction of Dornoch Sheriff Court. Under reser-
vation of this plea the alleged offence was proved, but on an appeal
at the instance of the Procurator-Fiscal the High Court of Justiciary
sustained the jurisdiction of the Scots Court.
The judges held that the prohibition in Section 6 of the Herring
Fishery (Scotland) Act 1889, being quite general in its terms,
applied equally to British subjects and foreigners, and that it was
not for the courts to draw a distinction which Parliament had not
seen fit to make. Lord Kyllachy was unable to see that any ques-
tion of jurisdiction in territorial waters arose in the case, since the
locus of the alleged offence was "well within the three-mile limit as
generally interpreted, and particularly within the definition of that
limit expressed (I think in entire consonance with international
law) by Article 2 of the International Convention of I882.""5  The
view of the court, therefore, was that Parliament had not exceeded
any rule of international law by enacting a prohibition for the Dor-
noch Firth, which was a bay less than ten miles wide at the entrance,
as defined by Section 2 of the North Sea Convention, and that the
prohibition must apply to any person, whether subject or alien,
within that bay, or within three miles seaward of the line connect-
ing the headlands.
But in the next case, Mortensen v. Peters, the facts of which I
have already stated, it was impossible to apply to the locus of the
offence the rules of the North Sea Convention as to territorial
59. Peters v Olsen, 7 Court of Session Reports, 5th series (Justiciary
Cases), p. 86 at p. 93.
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waters. The place mentioned in the complaint is "five miles east by
north from Lossiemouth" (a fishing village on the coast of Elgin).
It was therefore outside the three-mile limit, measured from low-
water mark. Moreover, Lossiemouth is about ten miles to the east
of Burgh Head, the headland on the Elgin coast forming the east
entrance to the Moray Firth proper. But as the place was undoubt-
edy within a line drawn between Duncansby Head and Rattray
Point, the case raised in the clearest way the question whether a
prohibition enacted by Parliament applied to foreigners when within
this area.
The argument for the appellant was based on the fundamental
proposition that as the offence in question was created by munici-
pal statute, it conferred jurisdiction only over British subjects and
over foreigners within British territory. A prohibition against an
act committed by any person meant "any person over whom the
courts have jurisdiction." Our legislation is primarily territorial.
It can in no case apply to foreigners outside British territory. Now
the appellant was a foreigner, and it was submitted that he was not
within British territorial waters when he was alleged to have con-
travened the by-law. By international law territorial jurisdiction
ends at the three-mile limit, with the exception of bays intra fauces
terr.6 10 There was no case in which a bay eighty miles wide has
been held to be intra fauces terra. So far as any width is laid down
as a limit the maximum is ten miles. Intra fauces terra implies
something narrow-a land-locked bay such as can be defended from
the shore. The Moray Firth, as defined by the by-law, does not
satisfy the requirements 'of any of the writers as to intra fauces
terra. There was no evidence that these waters have ever before
been claimed as territorial, and, of course, no evidence that they had
become so by acquiescence in that claim. In the North Sea Con-
vention the North Sea is defined so as to include the Moray Firth,
and the Convention admits that the waters therein dealt with are
outside territorial limits. If the appellant here had been a subject
of a power signatory to that Convention, and were claiming his
rights under the Convention, the court would not construe the Stat-
ute so as to make it at variance with the Convention. The court
could not construe it differently according to the nationality of the
accused. It was not the law of Scotland that all waters within a
line drawn from headland to headland are territorial. All that
Stair61 says is that bays are capable of being declared territorial.
6o. Lord Advocate v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, 189I, Court of Session
Reports, 4th series, p. 174.
61. James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair (1619-1695), was president of the
Court of Session 16 -1671. His Institutes of the Law of Scotland, published
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For the Crown, on the other hand, it was argued that in the con-
struction of the Statute there was no room for the presumption as
to the exclusion of foreigners, inasmuch as it was clear and uriam-
biguous in its terms, and related to an area specified and defined.
5.-To return to the several kinds of Real Rights,the first is that of Com-
munity which all men have of things which cannot be appropriate. . . .
Thirdly, the vast ocean is common to all mankind, as to Navigation and Fish-
ing, which are the only uses thereof, because it is not capable of bounds; but
when the sea is enclosed in Bays, Creeks, or otherwise is capable of bounds
or meeths as within the bounds of such lands or within view of such shores,
there it may become proper, but with the reservation of passage for commerce
as in the land.
The presumption was important only where the territory affected
was undoubtedly not British. Where it was clearly or even in dubio
British, the presumption did not apply. The appellant's argument
from the limits of the North Sea as given in the Convention failed
because those limits were agreed to only for the purposes of that
Statute which were quite different from those of the by-law under
discussion. Further, the Moray Firth is part of British territorial
waters on the principle that all waters are territorial which are
included within a line drawn from headland to headland. It is not
a valid objection that the application of the rule here included a great
amount of water. The only limit on the assertion of territorial
rights is that no more is to be claimed than is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the country's interests. Finally, even if the
Moray Firth is not for all purposes territorial, Great Britain may
make police regulations with regard to it in order to regulate the
fishings.
The leading opinion of the High Court of Justiciary was deliv-
ered by the Lord Justice General (Lord Dunedin), who treated the
question before the court as one purely of construction. The court,
he said, had nothing to do with the question of whether the legisla-
ture had or had not done what foreign powers might consider a
usurpation in a question with them. They had merely to give effect
to a Statute of the British Parliament. The argument for the appel-
lant as to the presumption against Statutes creating offences apply-
ing to foreigners was not conclusive, because the presumption might
be redargued (rebutted). The question was whether it had been
redargued on this occasion. In favor of an affirmative view was
the strong inference to be derived from the terms of the prohibition
in 1681, was the first treatise on the Law of Scotland, and is still of the high-
est authority. 4th edition, 1826 (ed. Brodie). The passage referred to is
from Book II, Title I, "Rights Real or Dominion, wherein of Community,
Possession and Property."
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in question. It was not an absolute prohibition against doing a cer-
tain thing, but a prohibition against doing it at a certain place.
"Now." he went on to say, "when a legislature using words of admitted
generality, 'it shall not be lawful,' etc., 'for persons who,' etc., conditions an
offence by territorial limits it creates, I think, a very strong inference that
it is for the purposes specified assuming a right to legislate for that territory
against all persons whomsoever. This inference seems to me still further
strengthened when it is obvious that the remedy to the mischief sought to be
obtained by the prohibition would be either defeated or rendered less effect-
ive if all persons whomsoever were not affected by the enactment It is
obvious that the latter consideration applies to the present case. Whatever
may be the view of anyone as to the propriety or expediency of stopping
trawling, the enactment shows on the face of it that it contemplates such
stopping, and it would be most clearly ineffective to debar trawling by the
British subjects while subjects of other nations were allowed so to fish."
His lordship next dealt with the argument that the locus of the
occurrence in question was not touched by the Statute in so much
as international law had formerly fixed it to be beyond the limits of
territorial sovereignty. There was, he said, no such thing as a
standard of international law extraneous to the domestic law of a
kingdom to which an appeal may be made. "International law, so
far as this court is concerned, is the body of doctrine regarding
the international rights and duties of States which has been adopted
and made part of the law of Scotland." It was, therefore, relevant
to inquire whether the locus in this case was beyond the limits within
which the British legislature might enact a prohibition directed
against all the world for the purpose of regulating methods of fish-
ing. That within the three-mile limit the territorial sovereignty
would be sufficient to cover any such legislation as the present, was
not proof of the counter proposition that outside that limit no such
result could be looked for. Moreover, the locus was admittedly
within the bay known as the Moray Firth, which the Crown said
was intra fauces terre. Although there was no exact definition of
this phrase, his lordship thought that three points might be referred
to as going far to show that the locus here might be considered as
lying intra fauces terre. He quoted the passage already cited from
Stair to show that according to the law of Scotland it might so be
considered. Moreover, the Statute under discussion shows that
claims were put forward to legislate in other places far beyond the
three-mile limit, e. g., the Firth of Clyde near its mouth; and, lastly,
the decided cases of jurisdiction in wide bays supported the same
conclusion.
"It seems to me, therefore," he said. in conclusion, "without laying down
the proposition that the Moray Firth is for every purpose within the terri-
torial sovereignty, it can at least be clearly said that the appellant cannot
make out his proposition that it is inconceivable that the British legislature
should attempt for fishery purposes to legislate against all and sundry in
such a place, and if that be so then I revert to the consideration already
stated, which as a matter of construction makes me think that it did so
legislate."
The argument from the terms of the North Sea Convention he
considered to fail because that Convention did not deal with what
was in dispute here, namely, a mode of fishing. The Act moreover
created no privilege in favor of British subjects, which was in con-
flict with the Convention. Subjects and foreigners are ex hypothesi
treated alike.
Lord Kyllachy, while admitting that on the point of construction
there was always a certain presumption against the legislature of the
country asserting or assuming the existence of territorial jurisdiction
going clearly beyond limits established by the common consent of
nations, pointed out that this presumption might be redargued for
the purposes. Express words would of course be conclusive, and
so would plain implication. In the present case he considered the
presumption to be redargued by the unlimited and unqualified terms
of the prohibition applying to a specified area, and further by the
consideration that the plain object of the enactment would have been
defeated if the prohibition were not construed to apply also to for-
eigners.
"Accordingly," he said, "it would be, I think, easier to suppose that the
legislature had reached even an erroneous conclusion as to the extent of its
jurisdiction, and had legislated accordingly, than that it had resolved delib-
erately to impose a futile restriction upon its own countrymen, and at the
same time to create a hurtful monopoly in favor of foreigners."
He further pointed out that the presumption had never been
applied except when the excess of jurisdiction was clear. The whole
ratio of the presumption fell if it appeared that the area which was
in controversy was at best only in the position of debatable ground,
being in effect within a category as to which different nations had
always taken more or less different views, and maintained different
conclusions. On the question of international law, his lordship held
that no evidence of any recognized and established rule on the terri-
toriality of wide bays had been adduced.
When one bears in mind that the court was construing an Act of
Parliament, it is difficult to see how in accordance with the rules of
law prevailing in Great Britain it could have reached a different
conclusion, for undoubtedly it is not the business of a British Court
to decide whether an Imperial Statute does or does not contravene a
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rule of international law. Whether in a question involving not stat-
utory but common law it would have applied the dicta frequently
expressed in earlier English and American cases, that international
law is part of the law of the land, is a question which one must
reserve until the case arises. To international lawyers the interest of
this case lies less in the decision than in the legislation on which it
turned. And here one cannot help feeling that the British Parlia-
ment, without perhaps being fully aware of what it was doing, has
made, in reference to the Moray Firth, a claim to jurisdiction to
which there is almost no parallel. The nearest claim is that made
by Russia for purposes of war and neutrality over the White Sea,
whose headlands are more than sixty miles apart, but other States
are not particularly concerned with claims which a neighbor may
make over waters within the Arctic Circle.
That this claim to jurisdiction over the Moray Firth was not
made by Parliament in virtue of a settled principle in regard to wide
bays is clearly shown by the Herring Fisheries Regulation (Scot-
land) Act of 1895, in which Parliament proved itself much more
chary in legislating, even for the purpose of fishery regulations, over
areas of the sea at a distance from the British coast. This Act by
Section io empowers the Fishery Board to issue fishery regulations
which shall be operative within thirteen miles of the Scottish coast,
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but for their validity it lays down strict conditions on a principle
for which Mr. Barclay, at the meeting of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law at Paris, endeavored, without success, to obtain recogni-
tion. As an addition to Article 2 of the Paris Resolutions he pro-
posed the following amendment :----"Dans le cas o~t un 6tat voudrait
soumettre la p~che A des r6glements quelconques jusqu'i une dis-
tance plus grande que six milles de la c6te, il faudrait l'assentiment
des int~ress6s." This proposal was rejected. It was thought to be
dangerous, as it might empower two States to put their heads
together and establish all the sea virtually a mare clausum. More-
over, "int6ress6s" was indefinite. All peoples are "interested" in the
freedom of the seas.
The Scotch Act, however, adopts this principle. It entities the
Fishery Board by by-law to direct that the methods of fishing
known as beam-trawling and otter-trawling shall not be used in any
area or areas under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty within thirteen
miles of the Scottish coast to be defined in such by-law. The
62. De Lapradelle, La Mer Territoriale, p. 56, erroneously gives the dis-
tance as thirty miles, and omits all mention of the conditions on which the
validity of the by-law is made to depend.
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waters opposite any part of the coasts of England, Ireland, and the
Isle of Man within thirteen miles thereof are expressly excepted.
The Act therefore relates purely to Scotland. As a condition to the
validity of the by-law the Secretary of Scotland must hold a local
inquiry in the district adjoining the part of the sea to be included in
the by-law, at which inquiry all persons interested shall be heard,
whether resident in the district or not, and notice of such enquiry
shall be sent to all Committees of sea fishery districts in the United
Kingdom. It is further provided that no area of sea within the
said limit of thirteen miles shall be deemed to be under the jurisdic-
tion of Her Majesty for the purposes of this section unless the
powers conferred thereby shall have been accepted as binding upon
their own subjects with respect to such area by all the States signa-
tory to the North Sea Convention, 1882.
It seems clear that but for Clause 7 of the Herring Fishery
(Scotland) Act, 1889, the Fishery Board could not subsequently to
this Act prohibit beam or otter-trawling in the Moray Firth even
up to thirteen miles of the Scottish coast without satisfying the con-
ditions of enquiry by the Secretary of Scotland, and assent on the
part of the signatories to the North Sea Convention as provided in
the Act. It would, therefore, seem that since the passing of the Act
of 1889 and before the Act of 1895 the mind of Parliament had
changed with regard to the extent of its jurisdiction in Scottish
waters. A. H. Charteris.*
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University of Glasgow, Scotland.
